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Understanding Capital Structure has been a continuing concern, with a significant 
amount of research done, different models developed and various activity sectors 
extensively analyzed. However, there are not many studies with focus on the 
capital structure in the renewable energy sector and its relation to risk mitigation.  
 
This study’s main purpose is to contribute to research on the capital structure in 
the renewable energy sector, especially in the case of PPPs, and to find whether 
these firms follow any of the classical capital structure theories and whether there 
is a relationship between their capital structure and risk mitigation, using as 
methodology the case study of a PPP wind power company funded through 
project finance and responsible for more than 20% of the energy produced in 
Cabo Verde, a small island developing state in Africa.  
 
In the case analyzed, our results can possibly suggest that (i) “pecking order” and 
“trade-off theories” partially explain the leverage and (ii) risk mitigation 
instruments in place, including the equity and financing partners involved, legal 
and contractual guaranties and regulatory framework, partially explain the 
leverage and significant share of participation of private investors. 
 
Keywords: Capital Structure, Public-Private Partnership, Risk Mitigation, 
Renewable Energy 
 







Entender a estrutura de capital tem sido uma preocupação constante, com um 
volume significativo de investigação efetuada, diferentes modelos desenvolvidos 
e vários sectores de atividade amplamente analisados. No entanto, não existem 
muitos estudos com o foco na estrutura de capitais no sector das energias 
renováveis e a sua relação com a mitigação de risco.  
 
Este estudo teve como principal objetivo contribuir para a investigação sobre a 
estrutura de capital no setor das energias renováveis, particularmente no caso 
das PPPs e procurar entender se estas empresas seguem alguma das teorias 
clássicas de estrutura de capital e se se existe alguma relação entre estrutura de 
capital e a mitigação de risco, utilizando como metodologia o estudo de caso de 
uma empresa de energia eólica que resulta de uma PPP, financiada através de 
project finance e responsável por mais de 20% da eletricidade produzida em 
Cabo Verde, um pequeno estado insular em desenvolvimento em África. 
 
Os resultados não foram conclusivos, entretanto, no caso analisado, poderão 
eventualmente sugerir que (i) as teorias de “pecking order” e “trade-off” explicam 
parcialmente a alavancagem financeira e (ii) os instrumentos de mitigação de 
risco em vigor, incluindo os investidores e financiadores envolvidos, as garantias 
legais e contratuais e o quadro regulatório, poderão justificar parcialmente a 
alavancagem financeira e a elevada participação dos investidores privados.  
 
Palavras-Chave: Estrutura de Capital, Parceria Público-Privada, Mitigação de 
Risco, Energia Renovável  
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The growing need for energy and the consequent increase of the energy 
infrastructure gap, at a worldwide scale and particularly in developing countries, 
the price volatility of energy commodities, which has caused a persistent search 
for energy independence, and greater global environmental awareness have 
together led to a stronger commitment by governments to develop renewable 
energy sources and mitigate the alarming increase in greenhouse emissions. The 
Kyoto protocol and the recent COP 21 meeting in Paris are the most relevant 
results of this commitment.  
 
On top of this, the recent economic crisis has put significant pressure on the need 
to determine an efficient capital structure that can enable firms to finance large 
infrastructure assets. This crisis has, at the same time, reduced some countries’ 
ability to finance infrastructure through public debt, particularly renewable energy 
infrastructure, which usually requires large amounts of upfront investment 
upfront. The ability to implement an efficient capital structure and the option for 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) arise as important topics for this ever-growing 
investment gap. 
 
In the specific case of Cabo Verde, the PPP model for renewable energy 
investment played and will most probably continue to play a critical role because:  
(i) the energy infrastructure gap is still significant; 





(ii) the country has a particularly vulnerable economy, importing most of 
the goods consumed and with oil derivatives as the main individual item 
of its regular imports according to the INE – National Institute of 
Statistics (trading statistics for the 1st quarter of 2016);  
(iii) being a small island developing state, it is specially exposed to the 
consequences of climate change; 
(iv) feasibility of renewable energy projects without public subsidy is 
possible since the country has good wind and solar resources and, 
being an island state, it has high electricity production costs when using 
conventional fuel-based power; 
(v) the country’s public debt is very high, above 115% of GDP already in 
2015, and is expected to increase in 2016 according to the World Bank 
country overview (2015), limiting government investment ability; 
(vi) there was a need for specific financial and technical expertise from the 
private sector, but the risks associated with the lack of sound financials 
from the state-owned utility company and the lack of an adequate legal 
and regulatory framework also requires government direct participation 
in the contracts for necessary guarantees. 
  
In fact, recent investments have increased renewable energy penetration in the 
country from 2% in 2010 to 25% in 2015. The Cabeolica wind power PPP in 
particular is responsible for 21% of the country’s energy consumption, positioning 
itself as one of the highest wind power penetration rates in the world, a PPP of 
reference in Africa and a leading company in the West African region. For a 
relatively small project in a small sub-Saharan African country, the importance 





and impact of this project as the first and only commercial-scale Wind Power PPP 
operating in Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) is indeed outstanding. 
 
1.2 Purpose and relevance 
 
For the reasons stated above, capital structure is indeed important for companies 
investing in large infrastructure assets, especially in the case of renewable energy 
where capital costs represent most of the total costs and where adequate risk 
mitigation and allocation between its investors and between investors and 
lenders becomes a critical success factor.  
 
The purpose of this study is precisely to understand the capital structure in the 
renewable energy sector, especially in the case of PPPs, and to find whether 
these firms follow any of the classical capital structure theories and whether there 
is a relation between their capital structure and risk mitigation. 
 
Capital structure theories have been studied extensively, but we understand that 
there are not many studies focusing on the capital structure of PPPs in the 
renewable energy sector, not many studies investigating its relationship with risk 
mitigation, something particularly critical to this sector, and definitely not many 
case studies in sub-Saharan Africa and small island developing states, places 
where the energy infrastructure gap is most significant and where, in many cases, 
renewable energy investment makes perfect sense. 
 





We understand that studying the capital structure and risk mitigation instruments 
of this specific case study also has significant practical relevance as it might help 
better understand the reasons for the company’s success and the key features 
that can ensure replicability in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
1.3 Preliminary hypothesis  
 
Applying the investigation made on this field to our particular case study, we 
expect the results from our case study to potentially indicate that “pecking order” 
and “trade-off” theories partially explain the capital structure decision and that risk 
mitigation instruments in place are relevant to the capital structure, since equity 
partners chosen, legal and contractual guaranties in place and regulatory 
framework can potentially increase the share of participation of private investors 
and the level of debt obtained from Lenders in renewable energy companies. 
Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis on our study: 
Capital Structure 
Hypothesis 1 - The capital structure in the case study is likely to follow “pecking 
order theory”. 
Hypothesis 2 - The capital structure in the case study is likely to follow “trade-off 
theory”. 
Hypothesis 3 - Leverage in the case study is likely to be similar to leverage of 
larger companies of the same industry in developed and larger economies. 
Risk Mitigation 
Hypothesis 4 – Leverage of the case study is positively related with Risk 
Mitigation. 





Hypothesis 5 – Private investors’ equity share in the case study is positively 
related to Risk Mitigation. 
 
1.4 Brief summary of previous research on the subject  
 
In this study, we analyzed the most relevant previous research related to Capital 
Structure and to Public-Private Partnership, particularly the main concepts and 
theories, risks and mitigation instruments, and we took into consideration the 
specific characteristics of the renewable energy sector. We started by analyzing 
the most widespread capital structure theories, particularly Modigliani & Miller’s 
(1958) “irrelevance theory”, the “trade-off theory” and the “pecking order theory”, 
and studied the concept, characteristics and main risks associated with a PPP 
and its financing, as well as consensual studies about mitigation instruments for 




We first review the relevant literature related to our study, particularly that related 
to the concepts of capital structure, PPP and risk mitigation, and we then analyze 
the renewable energy sector in Cabo Verde and the Cabeolica case in more 
detail. Here, we try to understand if this case follows any of the classical capital 
structure theories and whether there is a relation between its capital structure and 
risk mitigation. Finally, we reach possible conclusions and we highlight the 
limitations of this study and suggest further research. 
 





2. Literature Review  
 
2.1 Capital Structure 
 
Capital structure has been studied extensively for the last 50 years, with research 
focused essentially on searching for the determinants of an optimal capital 
structure. The research on this field started with the considered classical theories 
and particularly with Modigliani & Miller’s (1958) “irrelevance theory,” which 
assumed perfect financial markets and the non-existence of taxes and 
bankruptcy costs and indicated that a firm’s capital structure is irrelevant to its 
value, hence denying the existence of an optimal capital structure. Later, 
Modigliani & Miller (1963) recognized that some assumptions of the initial 
“irrelevance theory” were unrealistic and introduced the importance of tax and 
leverage, creating the “trade-off theory,” later complemented by others, namely 
Stiglitz (1969), Jensen & Meckling (1976), Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990).  
 
The “trade-off theory” assumed that (i) there are tax benefits related to leverage, 
since interest paid is deductible for corporate tax purposes and therefore 
increases the firm’s value, referred to as tax shields, (ii) there are various 
bankruptcy costs related to leverage, therefore there is a limit for leverage and 
(iii) there are agency costs related to conflict between stakeholders. In summary, 
firms should find an equilibrium between tax shields and bankruptcy costs, but 
also take agency costs into consideration. Furthermore, Frank & Goyal (2008) 
clarify the difference between static and dynamic trade-off theories, suggesting 
that the first theory considers a single period and the latter a larger time frame 





and that, with time, firms deviate from their original capital structure target, 
considering the influence of expectations and adjustment costs.  
 
Finally, it is of particular interest for our study to note that “trade-off theory” 
defends that firms’ leverage increases with size, profitability and tangibility and 
that there is a positive correlation between a firm’s leverage and its industry 
median leverage. Firms with tangible assets are in a position to provide collateral 
for debts, so these firms can raise more debt. Larger and highly profitable firms 
are able to obtain high debt ratio as they are less likely to enter into bankruptcy.  
 
Further research was conducted on the initial assumption that all stakeholders 
had access to the same information and, as a result, the “pecking order theory” 
first introduced by Donaldson (1961), and later popularized by Myers & Majluf 
(1984), was based on the key idea of asymmetric information. The understanding 
was now that owners and managers of the firms have access to more information 
about their firms’ risk and values than outside investors do, generating preference 
for internal (retained earnings) to external financing and debt to equity if external 
financing is required. In summary, debt to equity ratios only change with the need 
for external funds and not for the search for an optimal capital structure.  
 
In more recent studies about determinants of the capital structure, Harris & Raviv 
(1991) consider that leverage increases with fixed assets, non-debt tax shields, 
firm size and investment opportunities and decreases with volatility, advertising 
expenses, probability of bankruptcy, profitability and uniqueness of the product 
offered, while according to Rajan & Zingales (1995), leverage is positively 





correlated with tangibility of assets and size and negatively correlated with price-
to-book ratio and profitability.  
 
Most relevant to our specific study is the research already done about how capital 
structure is influenced by the industry, namely by Toy et al (1974), who studied 
industrial firms in four developed countries, Talberg et al (2008), who studied 
firms in multiple industries in the United States, and Frank & Goyal (2009), who 
also studied firms in multiple industries in the United States. The influence of 
regulation was also studied, namely in Bradley et al (1984), which  indicated that 
firms in the regulated electric sector in the United States tend to have high 
leverage ratios. Dias & loannou (1995), Wooldridge et al (2001) and Bakatjan et 
al (2003) studied models of appropriate capital structures for privately financed 
infrastructure projects in United States and Turkey.  
 
Moreover, Saeed (2007) studied listed firms in the energy sector in Pakistan from 
2001 to 2005 and tested the data obtained with “trade-off,” “pecking order” and 
“agency costs” theories and found that “trade-off” and “pecking order” theories 
could partially explain financing decisions in the energy sector, with “pecking 
order theory” being most evident.  
 
Later, Lino (2014) studied wind power projects in Portugal and found that these 
companies are usually funded through Project Finance by creating a new and 
independent company that owns the assets, which, together with the fact that 
they usually benefit from long-term feed-in tariffs, enable these projects to present 
high debt ratios of roughly 70% or more.  





More recently, Ricciardi (2016) reached relatively similar conclusions by 
suggesting that capital structures of United States’ firms follow “pecking order 
theory” and that capital structures are very much dependent on long-term 
guarantees that firms are able to provide to lenders, including Power Purchase 
Agreement (PPA), feed-in tariff, collateral assets and government subsidies.  
 
2.2 PPP and Risk Mitigation  
 
The existing literature provides a wide range of definitions for the concept of 
Public- Private Partnership. One of the most consensual definitions is from the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD; 2008), which 
defines PPP as an “…agreement between the government and one or more 
private partners (which may include the operators and the financers) according 
to which the private partners deliver the service in such a manner that the service 
delivery objectives of the government are aligned with the profit objectives of the 
private partners and where the effectiveness of the alignment depends on a 
sufficient transfer of risk to the private partners”. In the case of Cabo Verde, the 
concept of PPP is first introduced and defined by Decree-law 46/2005 of July 4 
as “the contract or union of contracts in which private entities, referred to as 
private partners, undertake on a long-term basis and before a public partner, to 
ensure the development of an activity aimed to satisfy a collective necessity, 
where the funding and responsibility for investment and operation are attributed, 
all or in part, to the private partner”   
 
Some authors have specifically studied PPP capital structures, namely (i) 
Moszoro & Gasiorowski (2008), who proposed the existence of an optimal capital 





structure for PPPs and assumed that it might be optimal for the public partner to 
become a shareholder in the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) as well, since the 
optimal capital structure of a PPP lies within the borders defined by the lower 
interest rate spread influenced by the participation of public partners and the 
potential savings from private management, and (ii) Zhang (2005), who proposed 
a model to optimize the capital structure and evaluated the project’s financial 
viability when it is subject to construction risk, bankruptcy risk and other economic 
uncertainties. According to this author, an optimal capital structure is determined 
to safeguard the distinct interests of both equity holders and debt lenders.   
 
It is, however, consensual that PPPs are usually funded through a project finance 
solution, creating an SPV with significant leverage and in which the primary 
guarantee for lenders is not the collateralized asset or a specific investor 
guarantee, but the capacity to ensure future operation cash flows of the SPV. The 
SPV is, therefore, an independent business, legally and financially created by 
sponsors using equity or mezzanine debt, used to isolate financial risk. 
 
These specific characteristics of Project Finance are studied in detail by different 
authors, namely Gatti, S. (2008). In addition, previous literature, namely Grout 
(1997), Allan (1999), Valila (2005) and Robinson H. et all (2010) have also 
reached consensus regarding the following main characteristics of PPPs, with 
focus on risk sharing: 
 The risk sharing between the public and the private partners in order to 
achieve optimal risk allocation and with the rationale that risks should be 
allocated to the entity that is most able to manage them; 





 The long-term involvement of the private partner in providing public services 
or assets to meet public interest objectives; 
 The existence of different project phases, including essentially design, 
finance, construction and operation; 
 Private partner should contribute with experience, innovation and 
management skills and make use of project finance to fund all or a substantial 
part of the project. 
 
Equally important and consensual are the following features of the PPP: 
 Can most commonly have the nature of Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) 
or Build-Own-Operate (BOO). According to Grimsey & Lewis (2004), a BOOT 
is an arrangement whereby a facility is designed, financed, operated and 
maintained by a concession company and ownership rests with the 
concessionaire until the end of the concession period, at which point 
ownership and operating rights are transferred to the government (normally 
without charge), whereas in a BOO arrangement the developer is responsible 
for design, funding, construction, operation and maintenance of the facility 
during the concession period, with no provision for transfer of ownership to 
the government.  Hence the difference lies on the ownership staying with the 
SPV company or being transferred to the public sector;  
 Work better with experienced and transparent partners and with clear and 
consistent legal and regulatory framework and  
 Should only be adopted if they are expected to deliver better Value For Money 
(VFM) when compared to traditional procurement methods. According to 
Devpryia (2006), assessing the VFM means comparing the cost of developing 





the project under a PPP model with the risk-adjusted cost if developed 
traditionally by public sector. 
 
It is also commonly accepted, namely by Van Herpen (2002), Grimsey & Lewis 
(2002) and Bertelli & Smith (2010), but also by PwC (2005), that the advantages 
of PPPs are essentially related to risk sharing, construction and operation costs 
efficiency, delivery time, innovation and management skills, as well as to the fact 
that its risks are associated with high transaction costs, deficient objective 
alignment and cooperation between the partners and increased cost of financing 
to the private sector. 
 
The Capital Structure research scope has also evolved to include risk analysis in 
privately financed infrastructure projects. Previous literature has focused on 
identifying categories of risk involved, determining the partner best placed to 
manage these risks and suggesting adequate risk mitigation instruments. 
 
Tinslay (2000) identifies 14 different categories of risk for infrastructure projects, 
namely supply/inputs risk, market risk, foreign exchange risk, operating risk with 
technical, cost and management components, environmental risk, infrastructure 
risk, force majeure risk, completion risk, engineering risk, political risk, participant 
risk, interest rate risk, syndication risk and legal risk. Later, Ng & Loosemore 
(2007) studied four categories of risk: political, legal, economic/financial and 
technical/project specific.  
 





Perhaps more consensual is the study carried out by Grimsey & Lewis (2002) 
identifying nine main risks: technical risk related to engineering and design failure; 
construction risk associated to quality standards, budget overrun or delays; 
operational risk related to increased operation and maintenance costs; revenue 
risk related to a shortfall in terms of quantity or volatility of prices; financial risk 
related to inadequate hedging of revenue and financing cash flows; Force 
Majeure risk related essentially to natural catastrophes; regulatory/political risk 
related to legal and political uncertainty; environmental risk related to impacts and 
hazards; and project default risk related to failure from a combination of the afore-
mentioned risks.   
 
According to Li et al (2005), risk allocation refers to a primary measure of 
assignment between the public and the private partners, while according to Shen 
et al (2006) and Wang et al (2009), risk allocation is one of the most important 
advantages of PPPs, as it enables public and private partners to share risk and 
is a prerequisite for a successful PPP. 
 
Although risk allocation strategies and risk mitigation instruments can differ 
significantly as a factor of the context of the specific country, sector and project, 
several investigations, including recent comprehensive studies by leading 
institutions, specifically focusing on (i) Sub-Saharan Africa and PPP, namely The 
Economist Intelligence Unit (2015) and (ii) Sub-Saharan Africa and Renewable 
Energy, including AfDB - African Development Bank (2015), World Bank (2016) 
and IRENA - International Renewable Energy Agency (2016), have proposed to 
identify the most common risks and recommend mitigation instruments to deal 





with those risks that we understand to be most relevant to this study and which, 
therefore, we summarize in the following table: 
Table I 
Summary of Risks and Mitigation Instruments 
 
Finally, regarding the role of multilateral development banks in risk mitigation, 
some authors, namely Hainz and Kleimeier (2006), Matsukawa and Habeck 
(2007) and World Bank (2016), have referred to the risk reduction role of these 
institutions through credit enhancement, experienced professional assistance 
and helping governments perform necessary reforms. Basílio (2011), meanwhile, 
has even studied, through an empirical approach, the specific relationship 
between the participation of these institutions and the legal and political risk in 
greenfield PPP projects. 
Risk Category Mitigation Instrument
Design Risk
Government to promote all preliminary studies necessary before 
procurement of private partners.
Technical and Construction Risk Turnkey EPC contact
Operational Risk Long term Maintenance Agreement
Financial Risk (Liquidity and hedging) Interest rate swap, currency derivatives and liquidity facility
Commercial/Collection Risk
Sovereign guarantee specially in developing countries given usual poor 
financial situation of public buyer
Legal and Regulatory Risk International Arbitration and Change  Change in Law clauses
Revenue Risk Long term Power Purchase Agreement and possible Take or pay 
Political Risk
Involvement of DFI and MDB and possible World Bank political risk 
guarantee
Project Default Involvement of DFI amd MDB, specially in developing countries





3. The case of the PPP experience in Cabo Verde 
 
3.1 Electricity and Renewable Energy sector in Cabo Verde 
 
Cabo Verde is an archipelago some 600 km off the west coast of Africa with ten 
islands, nine of which are inhabited, and is part of the Sub-Saharan Africa region 
where, according to the World Bank (2016), about 600 million people still lack 
access to electricity. Besides the struggles common to the region, like all small 
island developing states Cabo Verde faces specific geographic, economic and 
environmental challenges related essentially to its insularity (separate small grids 
and high transport costs, preventing an economy of scale) and the particular 
impact of climate change. Cabo Verde has no relevant natural resources and is 
dependent on the outside world for most things, including energy. 
 
Despite these significant challenges and the relevant vulnerabilities that the 
electricity system still faces, related essentially to high electricity costs and 
technical and non-technical losses, the country has registered significant 
improvement in key electricity coverage indicators and is leading the way for other 
sub-Saharan countries and small island developing states with regards to energy 
independence and sustainability through a high penetration rate of renewable 
energy, predominantly wind. Indeed, according to a study done by the African 
Development Bank and published on the Energy Research & Social Science 
Journal, Mukasa et al (2015), seven of the eight completed wind energy projects 
in sub-Saharan Africa are pilot projects with the only project operating at a 
commercial scale being the Cabeólica wind farm in Cabo Verde. 







Key Indicators for Electricity Sector in Cabo Verde 
 




Source: Directorate General of Energy of Cabo Verde, Statistics of the Electricity Sector, 2014 
 
Key Indicators 2003 2013 Change 2003-2013
Installed Capacity (kW) 78 554 140 581 78,96%
Production (kWh) 198 658 184 390 707 685 96,67%
Coverage Rate (%) 61% 96% 57,38%
Demand (kW) 36 889 69 895 89,47%
Consumption per capita (kWh) 371 713 92,34%
Production per capita (kWh) 438 763 74,25%
Electricity losses (kWh) 35 624 367 102 136 853 186,71%
Electricity losses (%) 21,19% 27,98% 32,07%
Black-out (number) 45 25 -44,44%
Black -out (minutes) 1 844 1 436 -22,13%
GDP (millions of CVE) 92 185 140 984 52,94%
Electicity clients (umber) 65 539 141 334 115,65%
78.55   79.21   73.89   
85.34   
104.29   
140.98   
2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Installed Capacity
Installed Capacity (kW)





Cabo Verde has not yet implemented the unbundling of its electricity system, as 
the public utility company, Electra, SARL, remains responsible for most of the 
production but also holds the concession for transmission, distribution and 
commercialization. However, it has already accepted special cases of 
Independent Power Producers (IPP), including two IPP based on wind Energy: 
Cabeólica, with a 25.5 MW installed capacity, and Electric Wind, with a 0.5 MW 
installed capacity. The energy sector in Cabo Verde comprises fuel/diesel-based 
conventional generation, but also a proportion from renewables - wind and solar 
photovoltaic (PV), given its high solar potential and the fact that the country is in 
the path of the North-Easterly trade winds, with consistent wind speeds of about 
9m/s, therefore resulting in considerable wind potential. 
Graph 2 
 
Source: Directorate General of Energy of Cabo Verde, Statistics of the Energy Sector, 2014 
 
The government of Cabo Verde recognized the financial and environmental 
problems of diesel-based power generation and attempted for almost a decade 
to capitalize on the country’s wind energy potential. Later, in 2007, the 





Government invited Cabeólica’s developer, InfraCo Africa Ltd., to conduct initial 
detailed studies that concluded that it was feasible to install wind capacity. 
Cabeólica was set up, supporting the ambitious government target of a 25% 
renewable energy penetration rate by 2012 and 50% by 2020. 
 
In Cabo Verde the government body that promotes and supervises public-private 
partnerships is the Ministry of Finance through the Unit for Privatization and PPP. 
So far, Cabeólica remains the only energy PPP and the only relevant PPP 
currently operating in the country, hence the focus of our study on this grid-
connected wind IPP. 
 
3.2 Cabeólica Project 
 
We selected Cabeólica, S.A. because of its leading role as the only operating 
commercial scale wind PPP in sub-Saharan Africa. The information included in 
this section is essentially based on available Annual Reports, but also news 
articles and personal interviews with the company’s CEO and CFO. 
 
Cabeólica, SA (Cabeólica) is a wind IPP company established in Cabo Verde in 
2009, resulting from a PPP between the government of Cabo Verde, Electra, 
SARL (the local public utility company) and private institutional partners, initially 
InfraCo Africa Ltd. (a donor-funded project development company that supports 
early-stage infrastructure projects in Africa) and later FINNFUND – Finnish Fund 
for Industrial Corporation (a Finnish development finance institution) and Africa 
Finance Corporation (a Pan-African development financing institution) as major 
investors. 






Main Stakeholders of the project 
Source: Based on Cabeólica’s Annual Reports 
 
The implementation of the project was indeed challenging due to major technical 
difficulties during the development and construction phases, related essentially 
to different and isolated power grids and logistical problems related to limitations 
with ports, roads and locally available equipment. Financial challenges where 
also important due essentially to the small scale of the project and the difficult 
financial situation of the sole client and local utility company, Electra, SARL.  
 
Despite the challenges, the construction phase began in December 2010, and 
since July 2012 the project has been fully operational and supplying clean energy 
to about 360,000 people, or 72% of the country’s population. 
 
Cabeólica represents an investment of € 61 million, 30% Equity from the private 
investors and 70% Debt from lenders EIB-European Investment Bank (2/3) and 





AfDB - African Development Bank (1/3), which enabled the construction of four 
wind farms with a total installed capacity of 25.5 MW through 30 V52 Vestas wind 
turbines, being 11 wind turbines in the island of Santiago, 9 in Sal, 7 in São 
Vicente and 3 in Boa Vista.  
 
The debt obtained from the lenders, EIB and AfDB, represented a total of € 42 
million with a tenor of 14 years and a fixed interest rate, including as collateral 
the mortgage of the wind farms, a pledge of the shares and a debt service reserve 
account. The Equity was funded through normal shares, share equivalent loans 




Cabeólica’s Balance Sheet 2012-2015 
 
Source: Cabeólica’s Annual Reports 2013-2015 
 
 
Assets 2015 2014 2013 2012
Non-current Assets 49 558 979 52 633 085 55 682 921 58 784 819
Current Assets 8 646 095 8 952 591 8 834 980 7 061 560
58 205 074 61 585 676 64 517 901 65 846 379
Equity
Share capital 31 452 31 452 31 452 31 452
Equity Instrum., Reverves, Retained Earnings 20 969 286 22 766 612 25 021 206 24 244 030
Profit/(Loss) for the period 1 385 453 636 840 -791 185 160 704
22 386 191 23 434 904 24 261 473 24 436 186
Liabilities
Non-current Liabilities 32 419 705 34 818 591 37 044 944 39 122 414
Current Liabilities 3 399 178 3 332 181 3 211 484 2 287 779
35 818 883 38 150 772 40 256 428 41 410 193
Equity + Liabilities 58 205 074 61 585 676 64 517 901 65 846 379
* C o nsidering investo r lo ans as equity
EUR







Cabeólica’s Income Statement 2012-2015 
 
Source: Cabeólica’s Annual Reports 2013-2015 
 
 
Cabeólica is financially self-sustainable with no public financial support. The 
energy produced is sold to its sole client, the local public utility company named 
Electra, SARL, based on a 20 offtake agreement which establishes a minimum 
take or pay amount to be purchased and a price incentive scheme based on 
amount purchased resulting in a base price and discounted tier 1 and tier 2 prices.   
This guaranteed long-term income stream generated by the offtake agreement is 






Income 2015 2014 2013 2012
Sales 10 516 731 10 474 073 9 983 059 8 454 641
Other Revenues 550 172 12 853 13 404 85 712
Financial Income 60 837 69 064 70 276 62 377
11 127 740 10 555 989 10 066 739 8 602 730
Expenses
Operation, Maintenance and other expenses -2 011 092 -1 873 342 -2 345 767 -1 696 567
Depreciation -3 085 539 -3 083 854 -3 083 209 -2 763 878
Financial Expenses -4 645 656 -4 961 953 -5 428 948 -3 981 581
-9 742 287 -9 919 149 -10 857 924 -8 442 026
Results
EBITDA 9 055 811 8 613 583 7 650 696 6 843 785
EBIT 5 970 273 5 529 729 4 567 487 4 079 907
Profit 1 385 453 636 840 -791 185 160 704
EUR






Cabeólica’s Key Financial and Technical Indicators  
 
Source: Cabeólica’s Annual Reports 2013-2015 
 
Regarding risk mitigation and in accordance with best practices, the company 
has a list of important contractual instruments in place, including: 
 Long term PPA with take or pay clauses, ensuring long term revenue stream 
with fixed price and a minimum quantity to be invoiced to the off-taker - 
Electra, SARL;  
 EPC – turnkey construction and installation agreement and long term SAA – 
maintenance agreement with the world leading manufacturer - Vestas, 
ensuring quality and timely construction process and continuous availability 
of the wind turbines for production; 
Key Financial Indicators 2015 2014 2013 2012 2010/2011
Electricity Revenues (EUR) 10,516,731 10,474,073 9,983,059 8,454,641 N/A
EBIT (EUR) 5,970,272 5,529,729 4,567,487 4,079,907 N/A
Profit for the period (EUR) 1,385,453 636,840 -791,185 160,704 N/A
Debt to Equity Ratio* 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 2.3
Debt Service Coverage Ratio* 1.87 1.74 1.59 1.21 N/A
Average Collection period (days) 65 73 82 79 N/A
Total initial Investment (million EUR) 61.0 61.0 61.0 61.0 61.0
Installed capacity (MW) 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.5
Production (MWh) 77,153 80,878 75,197 N/A N/A
Penetration rate (Cabo Verde) 21% 24% 23% N/A N/A
Average wind speed (m/s) 9.0 9.1 8.6 N/A N/A



















 Development and Investment Agreement between Investors, ensuring that all 
rights and obligations of both private and public partners are clear and that 
corporate governance is in line with global best practices, issues particularly 
important in a PPP;  
 Finance and Common Terms Agreement with Lenders, ensuring an adequate 
information reporting process and strict authorizations needed;  
 Escrow and Account Bank Agreement with banks, ensuring an immediate 
cash cushion in case of commercial default by the client, but also that all funds 
are held properly and in institutions with an adequate credit rating.  
 
Besides the contractual instruments, other factors also play an important risk 
mitigation role for Cabeólica, including:   
 The maturity of the technology used, as wind technology itself is one of the 
most mature renewable energy technologies available, while the V52 wind 
turbines used are one of the most mature and robust manufactured by Vestas; 
 Institutional and transparent public and private partners, as private partners 
are international DFIs and the public partner had clear political will for 
renewables and is seen as an example of transparency in the region, ranked 
40 out of a total 170 countries according to Transparency International; 
 Experienced advisers, as Cabeólica’s private investors have extensive 
international experience in relatively similar business structures and the 
external consultants used were top level, almost all of them based in London;   
 Comprehensive insurance policies, including property damage, business 
interruption, third party liability and terrorism  
 








The methodology used is a case study of a single and unique case, in which we 
analyzed the capital structure and risk mitigation instruments, especially trying to 
understand the behavior of the capital structure, as well as the possible relation 
to risk mitigation.  
 
To carry out our study, after defining the research questions, we researched 
capital structure theories with a focus on the classical “trade-off” and “pecking 
order” theories and obtained previous industry analysis in order to seek patterns 
regarding leverage and participation of private investors. Meanwhile, we also 
analyzed previous studies performed on risk sharing and mitigation on similar 
industry and business structures and tried to find risk mitigation instruments in 
place and possible relationships with capital structure.  
 
The following step was to obtain quantitative and qualitative data from the 
selected company – Cabeólica - through annual reports from years 2013 to 2015, 
news articles and interviews with key personnel, forming the basis for our 
analysis. Quantitative data relates to all measurable data, whereas qualitative 
data is defined by Denzin & Lincoln (2000) as text and narratives.   
 
The last step was to analyze all the data collected from the case study, compare 
it with the literature review and identify similar patterns. This process was 





consistent with the three-phase process proposed by Dube & Pare (2003), 
specifically Research design, Data collection and Data Analysis.  
   
Concerns still persist about the choice for a case study approach, related to the 
lack of rigor in research and the fact that they might provide little basis for 
scientific generalization. However, according to Yin (1994), case studies, like 
experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations 
or universes. In this sense, the case study, like the experiment, does not 
represent a ”sample” and the investigator’s goal is to expand and generalize 
theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical 
generalization). According to the concepts introduced by the same author, we 
can consider that the approach used in our study should be considered a 
qualitative approach with descriptive and holistic characteristics. 
 
Different strategies and guidelines have been proposed to evaluate the rigor of 
qualitative data. However, perhaps the most consensual is from Yin (1994) that 
proposes 4 different tests. Applying these tests to our case study, it is fair to 
confirm that the construct validity is ensured by the use of multiple data sources 
and confirmation of data with key personnel. Internal validity is ensured 
essentially by the pattern matching approach used, external validity is ensured 
because although a single case is used, the same patterns have been tested in 
the industry in developing and larger countries, while reliability is ensured by 
appropriately documenting the research procedures.   
 
 








Despite the limitations liable to arise from an analysis of a single case study, we 
did find for this specific case, patterns already described in previous literature. 
We focused on two classical theories – the “trade-off” and “pecking order” 
theories - and tried to confirm if they explain the capital structure behavior 
characteristics of our case study. 
 
In analyzing Cabeólica’s financial data, with a particular focus on leverage, the 
most important highlight is the fact that this SPV is highly leveraged, initially using 
the maximum proportion of debt usually accepted by the Lenders (70%). This 
means a positive correlation between Cabeólica’s initial leverage (Debt to Equity 
70%/30%) and the initial leverage of the industry as proposed by the “trade-off 
theory” and described by previous studies, namely Lino (2014). In another 
perspective, it is worth noting that Cabeólica demonstrates that it is possible to 
obtain a similar leverage proportion from high profile lenders to that of renewable 
energy companies located in developed or larger countries, studied by multiple 
authors and described in the literature review.  
 
Tables VII and VIII illustrate the similarity between Cabeólica’s leverage and the 
leverage of renewable energy companies from the European Union (EU) and the 
United States (US). Since the means for the EU and US companies are affected 
by outliers and by volatility evidenced through significant standard deviation, it is 
more appropriate to use median for comparison purposes.  






In a broader sense, leverage should be measured as total liabilities to assets, as 
it includes all different categories of assets and liabilities. Although total liabilities 
might include items which are not precisely debt in the narrow sense and total 
assets might include items other than tangible assets, given different tax and 
accounting realities, complex financial instruments used and the fact that lenders 
will analyze the full financial position of the company and not only debt and 
tangible assets, we understand that total liabilities to assets is an important 
indicator. However, debt to equity and debt to assets is also often considered in 




Cabeólica’s Leverage Indicators  
 










Debt / Equity 1.5479 1.5742 1.6062 1.6734 1.6004 1.5902 0.0469 -
Total Liabilities / Equity 1.6000 1.6279 1.6593 1.6946 1.6455 1.6436 0.0353 -
Debt / Assets 0.5953 0.5990 0.6040 0.6210 0.6048 0.6015 0.0098 0.7000
Long term Debt / Assets 0.5538 0.5626 0.5718 0.5921 0.5701 0.5672 0.0142 -








* C o nsidering investo r lo ans as equity 
and o nly lenders'  lo ans as D ebt






Leverage Indicators from EU and US Companies
 
Source: Ricciardi (2016), Sample of renewable energy companies obtained from Thomson 
Reuters database, being 33 from the EU and 17 from the US 
 
Cabeólica presents a very similar total liabilities to assets ratio and a relatively 
higher debt to assets ratio. Debt to assets ratio and, especially, debt to equity 
ratio might be affected by the fact that the data from Cabeólica corresponds to 
the very early stage of operations – the first four years – while the data from EU 
and US uses a wider period and a more mature phase of a group of companies 
that includes those starting with newly-built plants as well as companies that buy 
businesses already in operation.  
 
It is also possible to observe that in the initial phase when there was a need for 
external funds and the company had little or no internal funds, the investors chose 
debt over equity, maximizing the debt leverage up to the limit allowed by the 
lenders. This is consistent with the “pecking order theory,” which states that firms 
prefer internal financing to external financing and debt to more equity due to 
information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders to the firm.  






Debt / Equity 3.6228 0.8470 23.7242 4.3579 0.9607 20.8640
Debt / Assets 0.3730 0.3506 0.3622 1.0842 0.3911 5.7981
Long term Debt / Assets 0.2829 0.2867 0.2300 0.2756 0.2382 0.3153








Companies from European Union Companies from United States





The “trade-off theory” states that possible explanations for high leverage could 
be the size and the fact that this type of company has tangible and highly 
collateralized assets. However, when considering the specificity of this project, 
especially the fact that it is only 30 turbines of 850 KW each installed in 4 different 
islands in a small island developing state in West Africa, it is possible to conclude 
that it is a very small SPV and its assets, albeit tangibles, are not as collateralized 
as comparable assets in developing or larger countries where there is an active 
market, and that, therefore these aspects cannot explain the leverage. These 
results are, however, consistent with the extended form of “pecking order theory”.  
 
In the particular case of Cabeólica, it is fair to recognize that the high leverage 
(70%) and the high proportion of private partners in Cabeólica’s equity (roughly 
90%) is also strongly related to predictability of cash flow, because of a long-term 
PPA, the legal and regulatory stability of the country, contractual guarantees and 
other risk mitigation instruments in place. This is comparable to results from 
different studies referred to in our literature review, including recent specific 
studies about capital structure in the renewable energy sector carried out by Lino 
(2014) and Ricciardi (2016), and on risk allocation and mitigation in renewable 
energy sector in Sub-Saharan Africa carried out by AfDB (2015), World Bank 
(2016) and IRENA (2016). 
 
Nevertheless, the option to have significant participation of private investors in 
Cabeólica can also be partially related to limited public funds to invest in the 
energy sector together with high level of public debt. High public debt is 
unfortunately a usual characteristic of developing countries in sub-Saharan 





Africa, and in the case of Cabo Verde, although mostly concessional, the public 
debt has been increasing since the global economic and financial crisis of 2007-
2008 and is definitely a concern given the following levels: 
Graph 3 
 
Source: BCV – Central Bank of Cabo Verde 
 
With regards to risk sharing and risk mitigation, it is possible to highlight that 
Cabeólica did share risks between private and public partners using its PPP 
capital structure and did indeed implement instruments to mitigate all relevant 
risks commonly described in previous literature, including technical, construction, 
operational, financial, environmental & social, commercial, legal & regulatory, 
revenue, political, project default and force majeure.  
 
The following table analyses the most relevant risks faced by Cabeólica, the risk 
allocation strategy, as well as the risk mitigation instruments in place, and is 
consistent with best practices described in recent studies and referred to in our 
literature review, including Basílio (2011), The Economist / Intelligence Unit 
(2015) AfDB (2015), World Bank (2016) and IRENA - International Renewable 









2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Public Debt as a percentage of GDP






Cabeólica’s Risks and Mitigation Instruments 
 
Besides the importance that the risk sharing and implementation of all relevant 
mitigation instruments must have had in the success of the project and in defining 
its capital structure, another important factor often neglected in previous literature 
because it is applicable essentially in developing states, is the fact that the 
participation of multilateral development banks, in this case EIB and AfDB, acts 
as an effective mitigation instrument for legal and political risk. In fact, as these 
Allocation Risk Category Mitigation Instrument
Technical Risk Mature technology and experienced consultants
Construction Risk Turnkey EPC contact with experienced manufacturer
Operational Risk Long term Maintenance Agreement
Financial Risk (Liquidity and hedging)
Interest rate swap included in Financing contracts, local currency 
pegged with currency used for Financing  and liquidity facility available.
Environmental & Social Risk
Experienced Consultants and all necessary studies performed in 
advance
Commercial/Collection Risk
Escrow Account, the fact that the lenders are MDB and partial 
guarantee given poor financial status of public buyer
Legal and Regulatory Risk International Arbitration and Change in Law clauses in the contracts
Revenue Risk
Long term Power Purchase Agreement with Take or pay clause.           
An alternative would be feed-in tarifs.
Political Risk
Involvement of EIB and AfDB as Lenders and possible World Bank 
political risk guarantee
Project Default
Political will from public partner, Involvement of high profile and 
experienced institutional Private partners (DFI), Parasocial Agrement 
between Investors and Common Terms Agreement with Lenders, both 
with strict corporate governance and reporting standards
Force Majeure Risk
Comprehensive Insurance Policies and considering Force Majeure 































entities are usually privileged financial and policy partners for most developing 
states, their influence for compliance of public entities towards contractual and 
legal framework is of utmost importance. It is important to note, however, that this 
aspect is consistent with the study performed by Basílio (2011).   
 
Finally, it is worth highlighting the fact that the project is a successful and 
pioneering project in sub-Saharan Africa most probably because of the following 
conditions that set the project apart from similar projects in the region: 
 Risk allocation and risk mitigation instruments in place in accordance with 
the most consensual theories (see table IX) 
 Stable and transparent political, social, legal and regulatory framework 
 Predictability of Cash Flow with long-term PPA  
 Participation of Multilateral Development Banks (MDB) as Lenders as a key 
instrument to mitigate political risk 
 High profile experienced and transparent private partners, in particular 
Development Financial Institutions (DFI), increase transparency and 
alignment of goals between public and private 
 Experienced advisers (legal, financial, technical) 
 Mature technology and experienced technology partner (EPC&SAA) 
 
This successful set of conditions is consistent with previous studies indicated in 
the literature review related to the benefits and risks of PPPs carried out by 
Grimsey & Lewis (2002), Bertelli & Smith (2010), PwC (2005), Shen et al (2006) 
and Wang et al (2009) and more recent studies on risk mitigation and allocation 
in renewable energy sector in Sub-Saharan referred to previously in this chapter. 






6. Conclusions  
 
6.1 Main Conclusions 
 
With the objective of understanding capital structure and risk mitigation on 
renewable energy PPPs, in particular to find whether a specific case study follows 
any of the two classical capital structure theories and whether there is a 
relationship between its capital structure and risk mitigation, we studied the case 
of a PPP wind power company funded through project finance and located in 
Cabo Verde, a small island developing state located in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Applying the investigation made in this field to this particular case study, they 
potentially suggest that “pecking order” and “trade-off” theories can partially 
explain the leverage decision and that risk mitigation instruments in place can 
also partially explain the high leverage and significant share of participation of 
private investors. 
 
It is considered that the results suggest an alignment with the “pecking order 
theory” assuming asymmetric information since in the initial phase when there 
was a need for external funds and the company had no internal funds, the 
investors chose debt over equity, maximizing debt leverage. In addition, although 
there has been no significant investment since the initial phase, there is a 
continuous slight decrease of the initial debt and all small investments and shy 
growth are being achieved using internal funds, showing that, when available, 





there is a preference for internal funds over debt. In addition, the fact that the high 
leverage is obtained despite small size and tangible but not highly collateral 
assets, also reinforces the fact that the capital structure behavior is comparable 
to “pecking order theory”.   
 
The initial leverage of 70% also suggests the “trade-off theory,” as this theory 
defends taking advantage of debt for tax purposes up to a limit where bankruptcy 
costs start to become more relevant, and indicates that there is a positive 
correlation between a firm’s leverage and its industry median leverage. In fact, 
various studies done in the renewable energy sector in developed countries have 
come to the same conclusion, but this study is important as it shows the same 
leverage applicable in a similar sector in a small developing country.   
 
When comparing the capital structure of this PPP with the risk mitigation 
instruments in place, the results suggest that capital structure, in particular the 
high leverage and the significant share of participation of private investors, can 
be influenced by the risk mitigation instruments in place, including the existing 
legal and contractual guarantees, regulatory framework and equity and financing 
partners chosen.   
 
We understand that, by focusing on a specific case in sub-Saharan Africa, 
previous studies carried out on the subjects of capital structure and risk mitigation 
on the renewable energy sector located in larger or more developed countries, 
the present study leaves relevant suggestions and insights for this specific reality. 
 






6.2 Limitations and Further Research 
 
We understand that a relevant limitation might be the fact that our conclusions 
were based on the analysis of a single case, as Cabo Verde has only one PPP 
project and the project analyzed is also the first and only commercial-scale wind 
power PPP operating in the entirety of sub-Saharan Africa. It is therefore clear 
that the conclusions obtained are only directly related to one specific reality and 
arguable that multiple case studies of similar situations or an empirical study 
based on a significant sample would probably lead to stronger results and 
conclusions. 
 
We also recommend future research to analyze the specific effect of institutional 
ownership, particularly DFI, on Capital Structure decision in PPPs in the 
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